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1 Introduction
In the classical paper “The pure theory of public expenditure”, Samuelson (1954)
referred to a public good as a collective consumption good and he defined it as
follows:
“... which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual’s consumption
of such a good leads to no subtractions from any other individual’s consumption
of that good...”
Since then, we say that a public good is characterized by the properties of non-
rivalry and non-excludability. However, the fact that it is impossible to exclude
any individuals from consuming a good does not imply that all individuals make
the same use of it.
We observe that not all the individuals use public goods with the same inten-
sity. We argue that the distribution of end users of a collective good affects the
individual preferences and the welfare of the society. For instance, some agents
may prefer a swinging pool with few people while others prefer a more crowded
ambient. Some parents may prefer for their children a school where all the stu-
dents have certain characteristics while others are indifferent about it or even
prefer diversity in the group. On the other hand, we also argue that when using
public goods, congestion issues might arise that can be analyzed from a point of
view based on a common and objective perspective, as it is the case of physical
space or capacity restrictions; but in addition and at the same time individual
and subjective perception may also play a role.
In this paper, the aforementioned ideas lead us to provide a non-cooperative
approach to the provision of public goods, where agents decide simultaneously
not only their private contribution for the production of the public goods but
also a new variable that capture their level of utilization which may differ among
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individuals.1 In this way, we extend the original model by Bergstrom, Blume
and Varian (1986) to an scenario where individuals are free to modify their own
use of a collective consumption commodity.
To be precise, each player in our modified game, as in the standard one, rep-
resents a consumer endowed with an amount of private good that is used as an
input to get a collective commodity. However, the strategy sets are enlarged in
such a way that a strategy for a player is a pair given by her private contribution
for the provision of public good, and a parameter that specifies her level of use
of the public good. Thus, a strategy profile not only affects the individual prefe-
rences implicitly through the specification of the public good that is generated,
but also the profile of degrees of utilization affects preferences explicitly. In fact,
the payoffs of the game are given by the corresponding utility functions defined
over the bundle of private and public goods and the distribution of the level of
use of the collective commodity.
After showing existence of equilibrium for our non-cooperative game, we es-
tablish how the approach we propose leads us to the study of a variety of issues.
Note that within our framework, an agent may contribute privately to the pro-
vision of a public good, regardless of the level of her own use. In particular,
an agent may contribute to the collective good without using it or may use it
with a null private contribution. This fact allows us to give light to an altruistic
behavior which differs from the so called pure and impure altruism in the related
literature and also to discuss the free riding problem.2 We say that an individual
is altruistic when she is better off by contributing to the public good without the
necessity of modifying her own use. Thus, we show that when an agent is not
altruistic then her private contribution is null whenever she makes no use of the
1Although we focus on profiles of intensity of utilization, as we remark in the concluding
section, this new variable may admit other interpretations giving further approaches.
2See Andreoni (1990) for the distinction between pure and impure altruism.
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collective good, that is, to become a contributor a non-altruistic consumer re-
quires a real own use of the public good provided. Also within our model, we say
that the free riding problem arises if there is a player who use the collective good
without contributing to it. In this way, we conclude from our game that when
individuals’ welfare is decreasing with the utilization of the collective good, for
instance because of congestion problems or other type of additional externality,
then there is no free-rider at equilibrium.
On the other hand, we remark that the distribution of users of a public good
we consider in the analysis motivates further study of congestion problems, con-
sideration of nonanonymous crowding concerns and neutrality results within sce-
narios where collective commodities are privately provided. The neutrality theo-
rem, that goes back to Warr (1983) concerning the provision of a public good in
a voluntary Nash equilibrium, shows that if income is redistributed among con-
tributors so that a loser loses no more than her original donation, the equilibrium
remains the same. Within our framework, we demonstrate that, in general, a
neutrality result cannot be obtained. In spite of this, we go further and find
conditions to recover a neutrality result for our model.
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present
the game on the private provision and use of public goods to be analyzed, and
in Section 3, we show an equilibrium existence result for such a game. Section
4 includes some remarks regarding altruism and free rider issues. In Section 5,
we study how congestion and crowding externalities may affect optimal contri-
butions. In Section 6, we first present a non-neutrality example and then, under
additional requirements we prove a result on neutrality for our game. Finally, in
Section 7, we conclude with some remarks.
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2 A game on public goods
Consider an economy E with a finite set N = {1, . . . , n} of individuals who con-
sume a private good and a collective (public) good which may be subject to
additional externalities. Each consumer is characterized by external characteris-
tics, endowments of private good and preferences.
In spite of the non-excludability properties of the collective commodity, since
its use is not fixed and compulsory, consumers may vary their degree of utiliza-
tion. Thus, let α = (αi, i ∈ N) ∈ [0, 1]n be a vector that specifies the individual
levels of use of the public good.
Each consumer i ∈ N has an endowment of private good wi ∈ IR+ and a pref-
erence relation %i on her consumption of private good, the public good provided
and the distribution of users. Each preference %i is represented by an utility
function Ui. That is, given an amount of private good x, public good G, and a
vector α, the utility level for a consumer i is given by Ui(x,G, α).
Let us consider a game where the n players are the consumers. Each player
i decides both the contribution gi ∈ [0, wi] to the provision of the public good
and the degree of use αi, in percentage terms, of the consumer i. That is, the
strategy set for player i is Θi = [0, wi] × [0, 1]. A strategy profile is a vector
(g, α) = (gi, αi, i ∈ N). A real function f, defined on Θ =
∏
i∈N Θi, specifies the
public good that is provided for each strategy profile. Then, the payoff function
for player i is given by
πi(g, α) = Ui(wi − gi, f(g, α), α).
We remark that the distribution of the collective commodity users reflects
external characteristics of individuals that matter the others and generates ex-
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ternalities that may also affect the public good that is provided. Thus, the way
in which α affects the payoffs is tow-fold since each utility function becomes de-
pendent on α both explicitly and implicitly. We argue that α has a subjective
and an objective impact; the former is captured as an explicit argument of each
Ui and the latter is reflected as an argument of f. For instance, if we address
congestions problems, our model allows us to consider objective congestion levels
in the sense that are the same for all consumers, and at the same time subjective
congestion issues may appear provided that individuals have different preferences
for the distribution of people that use the public good.
Given a profile θ let θ−i be the strategy of every player except i. We have
that θ∗ is a Nash equilibrium if πi(θ
∗) ≥ πi(θ∗−i, θi) for every θi ∈ Θi and every
i ∈ N. We refer to a Nash equilibrium of this game as a private provision and
use equilibrium for the economy E .
Within this scenario, we say that a profile θ = (g, α) is dominated by θ̂ = (ĝ, α̂)
if πi(θ̂) > πi(θ) for every i ∈ N. This approach leads us to give a notion of
efficiency by considering the dominance relation. In this way, we say that the
vector θ is efficient if it is not dominated by any θ̂.
We remark that different interpretations of the vector α and different specifi-
cations of the utility functions and the function f leads to a variety of scenarios
as particular cases. For instance, if Ui(x,G, α) = Vi(x,G) and f(g, α) =
∑n
i=1 gi
we have the model of private provision of public goods provided by Bergstrom,
Blume and Varian (1986).
Moreover, our formulation allows also the analysis of the composition of a club
as follows. Consider each player i as a representative of a set of consumers of
type i and let αi be interpreted as the measure of individual of type i. A strategy




i∈N αi. Individuals in the club provide an amount of local public good
given by a function depending on the strategies of the types in the club. For





Note also that within the above scenario α defines the composition of the
group of consumers using the public good. When the aggregate size of the
end-users of the public good matters for the externalities they confer, but not
their characteristics, that is, preferences depend actually on
∑n
i=1 αi and not on
the distribution given by α, we have the case of “anonymous” crowding as in
Buchanan (1965).
An increasing line of research that grows out of the one initiated by Buchanan
(1965) defines different general equilibrium models with exchange and club for-
mation with nonanonymous crowding. See, for instance, Conley and Wooders
(1997, 2001), Ellickson et al. (1999), Allouch and Wooders (2008) and the refer-
ences there. Unlike our aim in the current article, the main question addressed
in many of these papers is whether it is possible to get an efficient decentralizing
price system in which prices can be based on publicly observable characteristics
and its relation with the core.
The model we present allows us the consideration of nonanonymous crowding
issues within a private provision of public goods setting. Our analysis is based
on a non-cooperative approach where players contribute in a voluntary way to
the provision of a collective commodity and we do not study market-like out-
comes. The formulation and analysis of the impact of nonanonymous crowding
on equilibria we propose leads us to address altruistic behavior of individuals in
connection with private contributions for providing goods that can be collectively
used.
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3 Equilibrium vs. efficiency
In this section, first we state sufficient conditions for existence of private provision
and use equilibrium and then we present some remarks on efficiency.
Theorem 3.1 Assume that the following assumptions hold:
a) For every i utility function Ui is continuous, non-decreasing in G and quasi-
concave in (x,G, αi).
b) f is a continuous function and f(θ−i, ·) is concave for every θ−i ∈
∏
j 6=i Θj.
Then, the set of Nash equilibrium for our game is non-empty.
Proof. The strategy sets are non-empty, compact and convex. In addition, since
f and Ui are continuous functions we have that πi is continuous as well. Then,
it remains to show that πi is quasi-concave in the strategy chosen by player i.
Let θi = (gi, αi) and θ̂i = (ĝi, α̂i). For each λ ∈ [0, 1] let θλi = λθi + (1−λ)θ̂i =
(gλi , α
λ
i ). Let G = f(θ−i, θi) and Ĝ = f(θ−i, θ̂i). Then,
πi(θ−i, θ
λ
i ) = Ui(wi − gλi , f(θ−i, θλi ), αλi , α−i) ≥
Ui(wi − gλi , λf(θ−i, θi) + (1− λ)f(θ−i, θ̂i), αλi , α−i) ≥
min{Ui(wi − gi, G, αi, α−i), Ui(wi − ĝi, Ĝ, α̂i, α−i)} =
min{πi(θ−i, θi), πi(θ−i, θ̂i)},
where the first inequality is due to the concavity properties of f and the fact
that Ui is non-decreasing in the amount provided of public good, whereas the
second inequality is guaranteed by the quasi-concavity of Ui in (x,G, αi).
Q.E.D.
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To analyze efficiency of equilibrium let us consider the following optimization




i=1 Ui(wi − gi, G, α)
s.t. f(g, α) = G
We remark that, under differentiability properties of the functions Ui and f,











. This condition is similar
to Samuelson’s (1954) in that they define the efficiency conditions for public
goods as an equality between the sum over all consumers of the marginal rates
of substitution between the public and private good and the marginal rate of
transformation.
In this model, the equilibria may be inefficient. To see this, consider the fol-
lowing example of the particular game stated by Bergstrom, Blume and Varian
(1986). There are two consumer, each of them endowed with one unit of private
good. Preferences for consumers 1 and 2 are represented by the utility functions
U1(x,G) = xG
2 and U2(x,G) = xG, respectively, where x denotes consumption
of the private commodity and G is the amount of public good. The Nash equi-
librium, given by the contributions g1 = 3/5 and g2 = 1/5, is not efficient. In
fact, note that the above necessary condition does not hold
4 Remarks on altruism and free-riders
A remark on altruism. Assume that the partial derivatives of the utility
functions and the function f are well-defined. For each i, let us consider the
partial derivative of the payoff function πi with respect the contribution of player
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MRSi, where MRSi is the marginal rate of substitution between private and
public good for individual i.
When γi(θ) > 0, the player i prefers to increase her contribution to public
good, without altering her utilization, by decreasing her private consumption. In
contrast, when γi(θ) < 0, if player i increases her contribution to the provision
of public good it becomes necessary to modify also her utilization level in order
to obtain a larger benefit. Thus, we may argue that if γi(θ) > 0 then player i is
altruistic at θ whereas player i is not altruistic at θ whenever γi(θ) < 0.
Next result formalizes the intuition that if at equilibrium an individual is a
contributor to the private provision of a public good without using it, then such
an individual is altruistic.
Proposition 4.1 Let θ∗ = (g∗, α∗) be a Nash equilibrium. Assume that player i
is not altruistic whenever αi = 0. Then α
∗
i = 0 implies g
∗
i = 0.
Proof. It is enough to note that if g∗i > 0, then player i is able to improve by
choosing a lower contribution to the provision of public good because she is not
altruistic.
Q.E.D.
A remark on free-riders. We say that a player is a free-rider at a strategy
profile whenever she is not a contributor to the provision of the public good but
she uses it. That is, i is a free rider at θ = (gi, αi, i ∈ N) iff f(θ) > 0, gi = 0 and
αi > 0.
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In which follows we state conditions that avoid the free-rider problem at equi-
librium.
Proposition 4.2 Let θ∗ = (g∗, α∗) be a Nash equilibrium such that f(θ∗) > 0.
Assume that f(g−i, α−i, 0, αi) is constant for every αi and Ui is decreasing in αi.
If g∗i = 0 then α
∗
i = 0.
Proof. Assume α∗i > 0. Then, player i has incentives to deviate by selecting a
strategy (g∗i , αi), with αi < α
∗
i , since the amount of public good does not change
and her payoff increases.
Q.E.D.
5 On congestion and crowding externalities
In this section, we focus on special situations where the profile of degrees of uti-
lization of the collective good affects the individual preferences for the consump-
tion of such a commodity and in this way crowding externalities are generated.
In particular, we address scenarios where congestion problems may appear.
We have argued that the use of a collective good may differ from an individual
to another and, it may be a variable that is included in the strategies of games
where the private provision of public goods is involved. In spite of this, we
remark that we can also consider situations where the utilization of a public
good is somehow given for a set of individuals under some circumstances. For
instance, we may think about the use of public hospitals by persons with a weak
health or the use of public schools by a family with many children, or the use
of a highway by people who necessarily have to use it when they go to work. In
this way we provide a variant of the game we have defined in Section 2.
To be precise, let A be a subset of players for which the strategic behavior is
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just to choose their private contribution to the public good provision provided
that their utilization levels of the public good are given by α̂A = (α̂i, i ∈ A).
That is, the strategy set for a player i ∈ A ⊂ N is restricted to be Θ̂i = [0, wi]
whereas the strategy set for player i /∈ A is Θi = [0, wi] × [0, 1]. A strategy
profile is a vector (gA, θ−A) ∈ Θ̂, where gA = (gi, i ∈ A) ∈
∏
i∈A[0, wi] and
θ−A = (gi, αi, i /∈ A) ∈
∏




i/∈A Θi is the set of
strategy profiles. Now, given α̂A = (α̂i, i ∈ A), the real function f̂ , defined on Θ̂
that specifies the amount of public good that is provided for each strategy profile
is given by f̂(gA, θ−A) = f(θA, θ−A), being θA = (gA, α̂A). In this way, the payoff
function for player i is given by
π̂i(gA, θ−A) = πi(θA, θ−A) = πi(gA, α̂A, θ−A).
We study the behavior of the private contribution best reply functions of
individuals in A with respect to the corresponding variables determining the uti-
lization levels of the public good that become crucial in the analysis. To do this,
we restrict the analysis to separated utility functions of the form Ui(x,G, α) =
ui(x) + Vi(G,α).
3 That is, individual preferences for the private good consump-
tion are separated from the preferences for the consumption of public good and
the profile of its use. To simplify, we also assume that the provision of the public
good depends only on the private contributions profile, that is, f depends only
on g and it is independent of the profile of utilization degrees. Then
π̂i(gA, θ−A) = ui(wi − gi) + Vi(f(g), α̂A, α−A),
3We state examples for which Vi(G,α) = hi(α)vi(G).
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with g = (gA, g−A), g−A = (gi, i /∈ A) and α−A = (αi, i /∈ A). Therefore,
∂π̂i
∂gi
(gA, θ−A) = −
dui
dx







where α = (α̂A, α−A).
For each i ∈ A, let Γi denote the best reply function for individual i when it
is well-defined and interior. When the reaction functions are attained at interior
points, we can analyze how contributions to the public good are modified as
functions of the degrees of utilization of the public good. Next we show that the
sign of the impact of the use of the public good on the contribution of an agent i
in A is given by the sign of the derivative of ∂Vi
∂G
with respect the the utilization
level.
Theorem 5.1 Assume that the function f is non-decreasing, concave and con-
tinuously differentiable. Assume also that for each player i ∈ A the functions
ui and Vi are strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable. Moreover,
every Vi is non-decreasing on G. Then, the best private contribution reply Γi of
player i ∈ A is well-defined as function of α and the sign of ∂2Vi
∂G∂αk
determines the
sign of the partial derivatives of Γi with respect to αk, for every players i ∈ A,
and k ∈ N.
Proof. Let a profile of strategies θ = (gA, θ−A) such that
∂π̂i
∂gi
(θ) = 0. Since
ui and Vi are C
2 and f is C1, then applying the implicit function theorem,
each contribution gi can be written as a function depending on the parameters



























if the denominator is different from zero.
By the concavity properties of f, ui and Vi and since
∂Vi
∂G






≥ 0 (resp. ≤ 0) if and only if ∂
2Vi
∂G∂αk
≥ 0 (resp. ≤ 0).
Q.E.D.
We remark that ∂
2Vi
∂G∂αk
≥ 0 can be interpreted as a supermodularity prop-




non-negative, then we have a notion of complementarity in the sense that the
marginal utility provided by the provision of public goof is increasing in its con-
sumption. In particular, Theorem 5.1 states that, under such a complementarity
or supermodularity condition, the larger the utilization of the public good the
larger the contribution determined by the best reply functions.
6 Neutrality
In a pure public good scenario, which corresponds to the particular case of
Ui(x,G, α) = Vi(x,G) and f(g, α) =
∑n
i=1 gi, the invariance result of Warr (1983)
and Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986), the so-called neutrality result, shows
that income redistributions among contributors that leaves the set of contribu-
tors unchanged will induce a new equilibrium with the same total public good
provision and each consumer has precisely the same individual consumption as
she had before.
The next example shows that the neutrality result cannot be extended to our
model without additional assumption.
Non-neutrality example. Consider two agents, 1 and 2. Agent 1 is endowed
with w1 = 1 and agent 2 has endowments w2 = 2. The utility functions for agent
1 and 2 are given by U1(x,G, α) = xG(2 − α2) and U2(x,G, α) = xG(2 − α1)
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respectively. Let f(g, α) = α1g1 + 0.5α2g2. Some calculations allow us to assure
that there is a Nash equilibrium for the associated game given by:
(g1, g2, α1, α2) = (1/3, 2/3, 1, 1).
This equilibrium leads to a level 2/3 of public good and payoffs (4/9, 8/9).
Let us consider a redistribution of the endowments in such a way that each
agent no losses more income than its original private contribution. For instance,
let ŵ1 = ŵ2 = 3/2. The Nash equilibrium is now given by,
(ĝ1, ĝ2, α̂1, α̂2) = (3/4, 0, 1, 1).
The associated levels of public good and payoffs are 3/4 and (9/16, 9/8).
Therefore after the redistribution the level of public good increases. Although
the participation levels are always the same and equal to 1, both players obtain
a higher payoff after the redistribution and the neutrality result does not hold.
In spite of this non-neutrality result, we state below additional assumptions
that allow us to extend the neutrality results by Bergstrom, Blume and Varian
(1986) to our framework.
Theorem 6.1 Let θ∗ be a private provision and use equilibrium for the economy
E . Assume that f depends only on the aggregate private contributions and on
the vector of utilization level , i.e., there is a function F such that f(g, α) =
F (
∑n
i gi, α). Assume also that given any α−i ∈ [0, 1]n−1 the function F (·, α−i, ·)
is concave. Moreover, for every i the utility function Ui is non-decreasing in G
and quasi-concave in (x,G, αi). Let ŵ be a redistribution of endowments such that
ŵi = wi for all non-contributing players and g
∗
i ≥ wi − ŵ for every contributing
player i. Then there exists an equilibrium θ̂ for the economy with endowments ŵ
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such that f(θ∗) = f(θ̂) and πi(θ
∗) = πi(θ̂) for every i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. Let us write ŵi = wi + ∆wi.
Consider the profile θ̂ = (ĝ, α̂) given by ĝi = g
∗
i + ∆wi and α̂ = α
∗. Note that
by definition ĝi ∈ [0, ŵi] for every player i.













The properties of f guarantee that θ∗ is a Nash equilibrium of the original




Ui(wi − Γ + Γ∗−i, F (Γ, α∗−i, αi), α∗−i, αi)
s.t. 0 ≤ Γ− Γ∗−i ≤ wi
(1)
To show that θ̂i is a best strategy for player i given θ̂−i, let Γ̂−i =
∑




Ui(ŵi − Γ + Γ̂−i, F (Γ, α∗−i, αi), α∗−i, αi)
s.t. 0 ≤ Γ− Γ̂−i ≤ ŵi,
(2)
Note that Γ̂−i − Γ∗−i = −∆wi, i.e., ŵi + Γ̂−i = wi + Γ∗−i.
It is immediate that players such that ∆wi = 0 have no incentive to deviate
unilaterally from θ̂ since the corresponding individual problems above (1) and
(2) are the same,
Consider now a player i such that ∆wi < 0. Then, player i’s problem (2)
is the same as (1) with a more demanding restriction that is held by the pair
16
(Γ∗, α∗i ) solving (1). This implies that (Γ̂, α
∗
i ) solves the optimization problem
(2) or equivalently θ̂i maximizes player i’s payoff when the others choose θ̂−i.
Finally, consider the case ∆wi > 0 and assume that there is a pair (Γ, αi)
solving problem (2) and differs from (Γ̂, α∗i ). Then, for every λ sufficiently close
to 1, λ(Γ∗, α∗i ) + (1− λ)(Γ, αi) is affordable4 for agent i before the redistribution
of endowments and by convexity this pair leads to a higher utility level than
(Γ∗, α∗i ), which is a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
7 Some final remarks
In this paper, we have introduced an approach to the private provision of a collec-
tive good that incorporates a new variable capturing the levels of intensity of use
of such a good, and the distribution of end users. As we have remarked, several
models can be obtained as particular cases. In addition, we have provided sev-
eral considerations regarding altruistic behavior, congestion problems, crowding
externalities and neutrality results, among others, that differ from those already
established in the related literature because of the effect of the new variable
determining the profile of level of utilization of a public good.
Our modification of the standard public good provision game and the findings
we present pretend to be a theoretical contribution. In spite of this, the modified
strategy space may be of interest for empirical analysis or experimental studies
that could be designed and used to test the predictions.
Finally, we point out that the extension of the standard set up we propose
allows for further interpretations of the new variable we introduce and not only
4Note that λΓ∗ + (1− λ)Γ ≥ Γ∗−i for λ close enough to 1, provided that the redistribution
of endowments is among contributors
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intensity of use of a collective good. For instance, by considering poverty allevi-
ation as a public good, our proposal and arguments may pave the way for new
insights regarding the theoretical and empirical literature on donations and, in
particular, on charity private transfers to the needy or giving to reduce poverty.
This may be part of future research.
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